University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book
chapters and other publications

Jepson School of Leadership Studies

2015

Learning from Failure: A Review of Peter Schuck’s
Why Government Fails So Often: And How It Can
Do Better (Book Review)
David M. Levy
Sandra J. Peart
University of Richmond, speart@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jepson-faculty-publications
Part of the American Politics Commons, and the Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Levy, David M., and Sandra J. Peart. "Learning from Failure: A Review of Peter Schuck’s Why Government Fails So Often: And How It
Can Do Better." Review. Journal of Economic Literature 53, no. 3 (2015): 667-74.

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications by an authorized administrator of UR
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Journal of Economic Literature 2015, 53(3), 667–674
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.53.3.667

Learning from Failure: A Review of
Peter Schuck’s Why Government Fails
So Often: And How It Can Do Better  †
David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart*
Peter Schuck catalogs an overwhelming list of US government failures. He points
to both structural problems (culture and institutions) and incentives. Despairing of
cultural change, Schuck focuses on incentives. He relies on Charles Wolf  ’s theory of
nonmarket failures in which “internalities” replace the heavily-studied market failure
from externalities (Wolf 1979). Internalities are evidence of a discord between the
public goals by which a program is defended and the private goals of its administrators. What might economists contribute? We suggest that economists have neglected
internalities because they take group goals as exogenously determined and we defend
an alternative tradition in which group goals are endogenously determined. ( JEL A11,
D72, D82)

1.

whatever reservations we share with him
about the long-term solvency of the system.
On Schuck’s terms, Social Security works for
now. Most of the other policies he discusses
do not pass this bar.
Perhaps surprisingly, given the title of his
book, Schuck’s research will not delight the
believer in limited government who also
believes in reform. Nor, however, will it please
those who count themselves as progressives.
His is a brave book that closely examines
what policy measures try to do and what
they actually accomplish. It is rooted in “the
real world outside Washington DC” (p. 229),
unvarnished and difficult to change as that
is. Schuck’s criteria for policy success are

Introduction

A

s we remember the hopes that accompanied some of the programs that enter
into Peter Schuck’s catalog of US domestic
policy failures, reading his Why Government
Fails So Often is enormously depressing.
So voluminous is the list of failures that
his assessment of the success of the Social
Security System (pp. 337–39) brought a
measure of cheer. We say this in spite of
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modest: “whether a policy’s benefits exceed
its costs and whether it is cost-effective”
(p. 41). He is a self-described “melioristic
realist” (p. 26), a pragmatist whose conclusions emerge from wide and careful observation of policy outcomes. A major theme of
Schuck’s study is that whatever reform one
might propose will be hostage to the same
problems that plague the original policy.
Hence, he favors reform at the margin, as
opposed to reconstruction and overhaul.
Schuck’s examination is both wide,
encompassing a long historical swath of policy, and detailed. To make even his short
list of successes, he reaches far back in
history to the Homestead and the Morrill
Acts of 1862 (pp. 331–37) before considering the Social Security Act of 1935. Yet he
does not p
 resume to be exhaustive in his
examination of government policy. Schuck
limits the treatment to domestic national
policies; state and local government thus are
removed from the examination. So, too, is
foreign policy.
Why Government Fails consequently
omits significant examples of government
failure. Eugenic policy—especially “negative” eugenic measures—must count as a
policy disaster; yet since sterilization laws
were implemented by states, they fall outside Schuck’s compendium.1 It is perhaps
worth noting that forced sterilization represents a failure at a deeper level than that
of the cost–benefit calculus to which Schuck
adheres. His cost–benefit analysis, citing
the tradition of Kaldor–Hicks, depends
upon the possibility of compensation for
1 Schuck’s study does, however, encompass immigration
policy and here might have noted the historical connections
with eugenic theorizing. In their study of Jewish immigration, the statisticians Karl Pearson and Margaret Moul
asked “What purpose would there be in endeavouring to
legislate for a superior breed of men, if at any moment it
could be swamped by the influx of immigrants of an inferior race, hastening to profit by the higher civilisation of an
improved humanity?” (Pearson and Moul 1925, p. 7)

harms (p. 44), but what possible compensation could there be for children who would
never be born? In addition, Kaldor–Hicks
compensation is imagined to take place in
monetary units so that all goals collapse to
one. We shall return to the specification of
unitary goals below.
The subtitle of the book, And How It
Can Do Better, frames Schuck’s reformist
agenda. His discussion of what can be done
to improve matters is, if anything, more
depressing than the compendium of failures
itself. He divides the reasons for failure into
“structural” causes—such as culture and
institutions—and incentives. Most policy
failures, he argues, are structural: “they grow
out of a deeply entrenched policy process, a
political culture, a perverse official incentive
system, individual or collective irrationality,
inadequate information, rigidity and inertia,
lack of credibility, mismanagement, market
dynamics, the inherent limits of law, implementation problems, and a weak bureaucratic system” (p. 372).
The inescapable conclusion is that the
probability of large-scale reform is nil.
Nothing in the American system escapes
blame. The Constitution was designed to
encourage divided government. Republican
government, as has been known for millennia, is plagued by faction. Democracy
seems to depend on informed participants,
but its students have known for centuries
that information gaps and irregularities
(pp. 161–72) and collective action problems
persist (pp. 136–37). In separate chapters,
Schuck discusses America’s long historical
engagement with “localism” and individual
choice (chapter 4), its “rights obsession” that
“impoverishes political discourse” (p. 104),
and markets that frequently confound and
compete with policy choices (chapter 7).
Such “cultural values,” he writes, “are constitutionally inscribed and all are so deeply
embedded in our national psyche that they
are alterable, if at all, only slowly and at the
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margins” (p. 374). Thus, the structural context is not the most promising context for
successful political action. Inertia persists
in part because those who are in the system
have no incentive to improve: “Congress is
well aware of its poor reputation with the
public,” for instance, yet it “shows no interest
in reforming itself” (p. 380).
2.

The Role of Economists

Schuck therefore enters the economist’s
bailiwick with a laser-like focus on incentives, an approach consistent with “cautious
incremental” reform to the systems he predicts will, for the most part, persist (p. 372).
Moral hazard comes in for special attention,
especially in Schuck’s discussion of the roles
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the
subprime mortgage meltdown (pp. 141–42)
and present and worsening problems associated with student financial aid policies
(pp. 261–66). In the case of Dodd–Frank,
he finds that policymakers seem “to have
learned the wrong lesson from this fiasco,”
increasing “moral hazard by broadening
Wall Street’s safety net” (p. 142). Perhaps
unsurprisingly, Schuck maintains that they
would do well instead to attenuate or perhaps not create moral hazard in the first
place. For those programs that are inevitably subject to moral hazard, he advocates
cost sharing “adequate to assure that beneficiaries have enough skin in the game to
act responsibly, with the amounts scaled to
what they can afford” (p. 383). Here, he also
focuses on improved information flows as a
means by which the public, and especially
the poor public, might be better served by
policy. Schuck cites research by Caroline
Hoxby and Sarah Turner in support of
cost-effective measures that provide information to low-income college-ready students (pp. 397–98).
Another glimmer of hope is evident in
Schuck’s lengthy discussion of Charles Wolf’s
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theory of “non-market failures” (Wolf 1979).
We quote part of the passage:
The most important category of nonmarket
failure is what he [Wolf] calls “internalities”
(corresponding to the “externality” 
problem
in private markets.) Internalities are the private goals that apply within non-market organizations to guide, regulate, and evaluate the
performance of agencies and their personnel.
These goals are “private” . . . because they—
rather than, or at least in addition to the
agency’s “public” purposes—provide the
moti
vation behind individual and collective
behavior (p. 150).

This insight, along with the focus on
incentives and information, opens the way
for an additional positive contribution by
economists. Perhaps a policy fails because
it fails to align the private goals of acting
individuals who administer the policy and
those in the collective polity who establish
the administrating agencies on the basis of
an articulation of public goals. Economists
typically take Wolf’s “public” goals as motivational forces, whereas they may neglect
important private goals that counteract or
confound the so-called “public” goals. To
put this somewhat differently, if a policy is
designed to address a “public” goal at the
expense of the private hopes and desires of
those who make up the collective, its failure may be altogether predictable, as those
whose hopes and desires conflict with the
policy are motivated to undermine the “public” policy goal. Private actors may actively
work to prevent the implementation of the
policy or to avoid its consequences and the
policy then “fails” because it is never implemented as originally planned. Alternatively,
as in the case of eugenics, the policy is forced
into place and coercion is used to override
the desires of a segment of the population
in the name of a so-called “public” goal—
“racial betterment.” In either case, the specification of the “public” goal is mismatched
with private goals.
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This is not a new insight. In 1961, James
Buchanan explained to Kermit Gordon2
that the difference between the economics tradition in which he participated, that
of Frank Knight and his students, and the
orthodox economics tradition to which he
thought Gordon adhered, was that Knight,
Buchanan, and their followers did not take
group goals as exogenously determined. As is
well known, Buchanan opposed the Kaldor–
Hicks approach to compensation by which all
individual goals are collapsed into one exogenously determined goal (Buchanan 1959).
George Stigler, who began his career steeped
in the economics of Knight, remarked that to
conclude that a decision is a mistake meant
only that one failed to understand it, that
is, the goal to which it was directed (Stigler
1975, p. x). If economists misspecify group
goals or posit group goals that are supposed
to override individual ones, then policy “failure” might be a result of their misunderstanding of the process they presumed to
model. Such a modeling failure might well be
independent of the US Constitution, democracy, or any of the deep American cultural
facts Schuck cites as explanations of failure.
Indeed, if government failure were
uniquely related to American institutions and
culture, then there should be little or no policy failure when we move away from the US
structural situation. This empirical question
lies beyond the confines of Schuck’s already
extensive treatment. He does, 
however,
2 Shortly after, Gordon would become a member
of President John F. Kennedy’s Council of Economic
Advisors. He was, at the time of the correspondence,
Director of the Program for Economic Development and
Administration at the Ford Foundation. Buchanan and his
colleagues at the Thomas Jefferson Center applied in May
1960 to the Ford Foundation for $1.14 million to support
the Center. Buchanan, Warren Nutter, and University
of Virginia president, Edgar Shannon, met with Ford
Foundation officials on August 31, 1960. They were unsuccessful in their attempt to obtain support. The application
and related documents are reproduced in Levy and Peart
2014.

provide comparisons with Canada and
Australia that are significant: there, adaptation to change was more rapid and, he
argues, more conducive to obtaining highly
skilled immigrants (p. 181). If inflexibility
is a peculiar result of the American system,
perhaps there are ways to emulate some of
the flexibility associated with a parliamentary
system.
To this fixation with the inflexibility of
system one might add some evidence from
nondemocratic regimes with centrally
directed economies. When the Soviet Union
was extant, many economists predicted
that the Soviet economy would shortly surpass the American. Students at the time
were advised to learn Russian, as that was
surely the language of future economists.
American 
economics textbooks published
between 1960 and 1980 compared the supposed growth rates of the US and Soviet
economies, relying on what we now know
to be significant overstatements of Soviet
growth. Textbooks that employed the production possibility frontier as a device to
compare American and Soviet growth rates
claimed that Soviet growth outpaced that of
the American economy year after year, and
yet the size of the Soviet economy never
caught up to the American. The textbooks
did not call attention to this contradiction;
it was pointed out decades after the fact.
(We return to this failure to acknowledge
disconfirming evidence when we discuss
Schuck’s concern with types of reasoners.)
By contrast, textbooks without the production possibility model refrained from making
predictions about the growth or size of the
Soviet economy, so they did not contain this
contradiction (Levy and Peart 2011).
How does this example relate to the public/private goal distinction noted above? The
production possibility set in the textbooks
described what was feasible for an economy
in terms of public goals of plenty and power.
When the economy is on the frontier of the
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production possibility set, all of its resources
are expended in pursuit of these public goals
and there is nothing left for expenditure on
the private goals referred to by Wolf and
Schuck. The textbook modeling exercise
assumed away all the (private) rent-seeking
activity that enriched some of the population while it pushed the Soviet society into
the interior of the production possibility set
(Levy and Peart 2008). The failure of eugenics provides a second example of how policy
failed by neglecting private goals.
The first thing for economists to do is to get
the private goals right. Accordingly, Schuck
pushes hard on incentives in his analysis and
his suggestions for improvement focus on
the incentives of the people directly affected
by the policies in question. He rightly argues
that those who design and implement policy
would be well advised to take incentives into
account. But those who implement policy
also have private goals, and here perhaps
another opportunity exists to reduce the
instances and severity of policy failure. Like
the Soviet rent seekers who lined their pockets while consumers were unable to purchase ordinary goods and services, those who
design, recommend, or implement policy are
also subject to incentives. If policy modelers
fail to take these incentives into account, any
policy may well be hijacked.
Schuck rightly focuses on the “structural and endemic features” of the federal
bureaucracy (p. 307), noting that there are
sometimes sixty layers of decisionmakers
and a vacuum of leadership in federal agencies (pp. 318, 315). To these, we would add
a nod to incentives of the bureaucrats and
policy advisors themselves. When an agency
is established, modelers need to inquire
about the private goals of those who will fill
the bureaus. Schuck and Wolf cite agency
budgetary growth as a concern (p. 151),
but using budgetary growth as an indicator
of incentives run amok will produce mixed
results. Agency growth may be the result of
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s uccessful rent-seeking behavior, but it may
instead be the result of public approval of the
mission and successful delivery of the service.
Concern about budgets speaks to the usual
considerations of income and status; however, if there is an ideological “mission creep”
that, too, might push the agency beyond what
elected policymakers imagined at the outset.
The attempt to use public health procedures
to regulate ammunition sales provides a case
in point. The goals of those who staff the
public health agencies may differ markedly
from those who cast votes in congressional
elections. Hawkins (2012) puzzles over the
EPA’s reluctance to push ahead in this direction, although the propensity of voters to
remove congressional gun control advocates
seems obvious enough.
3.

The Role of Experts
and Private Goals

Schuck discusses the role of the
securities-rating firms in the financial meltdown (p. 61). This episode is a critical one for
economists. It was, after all, economists who
studied the performance of ratings in detail
consequent to their use in New Deal banking policy (National Bureau of Economic
Research 1941; Hickman 1958). The context
was how to ensure against another banking collapse after the Great Depression.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt himself
questioned whether it was good policy to
insure all banks, sound and unsound.3 At
the time, bond ratings were regarded as the
means by which to distinguish sound from
unsound investments. The first academic
study of bond ratings (Harold 1938) documented the private incentives of the four
3 At his first Presidential news conference, Roosevelt
stated the problem with Federal insurance: “The general
underlying thought behind the use of the word ‘guarantee’ with respect to bank deposits is that you guarantee bad
banks as well as good banks.” (Phillips 1995, p. 38).
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extant ratings agencies to bias their ratings
upward. The principle is simple: no one
complains about a rating that is too high.
College teachers, who grade student work
and occasionally referee journal articles, are
familiar with the incentives.
To deal with the incentive to bias,
Harold’s study offered the plausible heuristic of using the minimum of the four ratings.
Subsequently, the NBER study of the performance of the ratings, commissioned by
the FDIC, tabulated the universe of large US
corporate bonds of the period and 10 percent
of the smaller bonds (Hickman 1958.) The
NBER analysts also worried about the tendency to upward bias and they consequently
devised a “composite” rating, the downward-rounded median of multiple ratings.4
What seems to have happened is that,
because the rating agencies were initially not
trusted to serve only the public goal of providing accurate ratings, precautions were put
into place against the predicted upward bias.
For decades thereafter, this worked well
enough. But as the ratings became trusted
over time, precautions against private goals
fell away. By the onset of the financial crisis,
it was common practice to shop for ratings
and it became acceptable to rely on only one,
the highest obtained. Analysts who had once
used a worst-case estimate of the soundness
of a security moved to the most optimistic
estimate possible. The change seems to have
happened without much public awareness
or discussion of the incentives involved, and

4 “When only one rating could be obtained for an issue,
the coded value of that rating was used as the composite
rating. If two ratings were available, the composite is the
arithmetic mean of the coded values of the two, rounded
downward in the event of a fractional value, to the next
lower rating (i.e. grade II is the composite rating assigned
an issue rated Aaa by Moody’s and A1 by Standard). For
three ratings, the composite is the middle value of the array
of coded ratings; for four values, it is the arithmetic mean
of the middle two (rounded downward in the event of a
split rating).” Hickman (1958, p. 143).

hence the growing fragility of the system
went largely unremarked.
As noted above, lack of information
looms large in Schuck’s discussion of policy failures. He expresses deep skepticism
about the role of the courts in any reform
program because, as he sees it, judges are
not experts; indeed, they are often ill-informed about technical matters (p. 171).
Such skepticism stands in contrast with
Judge Richard Posner’s optimism (Posner
1999a, 1999b) about the efficacy of a naïve
jury advised by contending expert witnesses
in determining monetary damages for civil
matters. Of course, in Posner’s example, the
contending experts are biased witnesses for
their clients, but everyone involved is aware
of the bias. The rule of discovery coupled
with motivated examination creates a considerable amount of transparency and, he
argues, a more intense scrutiny than sometimes occurs in academic economics.5 As a
consequence, the opinions of contending
experts are sufficiently reliable and the jury
might simply split the difference in their
estimates of damages (Froeb and Kobayashi
1996; Posner 1999a, p. 1539).
In the expert witness case, the conjunction
of competition, awareness of expert bias, and
a procedure that offers the evidence to all
parties suffices to yield trustworthy (unbiased) results. Does such a conjunction exist
outside the court system, in the world of policy recommendation and implementation?
Schuck’s account suggests that it does not,
presently. Perhaps one additional idea for
reform is to make disputes about policy proposals subject to such a process: advocates for
and against a policy and required disclosure
5 Posner (1999b, p. 94): “expert evidence is subject
to intense critical scrutiny. . . . In the case of economics, where the tradition of replicating previous studies is
weaker than in the natural sciences, a study conducted for
purposes of litigation is more likely to receive more intense
scrutiny than an academic study, even one published in a
refereed journal.”

Levy and Peart: Learning from Failure
rules would allow the voting public to assess
the contending cases contingent on richer
information sets and with full knowledge of
the incentive to bias.
4.

Conclusion

Early in his book, Schuck (pp. 57–58) cites
Philip Tetlock’s Expert Political Judgment
research on alternative styles of reasoning
that, following Isaiah Berlin’s use of the
fragment of the Greek poet Archilochos,
he labels “hedgehogs” and “foxes” (Tetlock
2005). Hedgehogs know one big thing, the
trick that always works, and foxes know many
things that rarely work.6 As Tetlock explains
it, the problem with hedgehogs is that
they are not equally open to disconfirming
evidence.
Hedgehogs bear a strong family resemblance
to high scorers on personality scales designed
to measure needs for closure and structure—
the types of people who have been shown in
experimental research to be more likely trivialize evidence that undercuts their preconceptions and to embrace evidence that reinforces
their preconceptions (2005, p. 81).

Such “trivialized evidence” was apparent
in the treatment, discussed above, of Soviet
growth by some economists. When predictions of Soviet growth failed to materialize, a
wealth of confounding factors was provided
to “explain” the failure of the prediction.
Without knowledge of personality type or
the ability to look back at events of earlier
decades, how might economists use Tetlock’s
insight? The issue of whether group goals
can be taken as exogenous or not may provide the means by which to move from
hidden psychological traits to observable
models. If group goals are exogenous, the
6 Guy Davenport provides an interpretative translation
of the fragment of Archilochos: “Fox knows eleventythree
tricks and still gets caught; Hedgehog knows one but it
always works.” Davenport (1980, p. 57).
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implementation of policy is fundamentally
an engineering calculus. But once the goals
are taken as endogenous in an ill-understood
process, as Wolf and those in the tradition of
Knight suggest, then implementation is contingent upon the shifting goals and ambiguity pours into the analysis.
For whom does the hedgehog’s trick
always work? For the hedgehog, of course,
but not always for the public who depends
upon the hedgehog’s analysis. Short of economists becoming foxes, perhaps the best we
can hope for is a world in which motivated
hedgehogs compete with each other in some
more transparent manner akin to expert witnesses in civil litigation.
Adam Smith was much struck by the difficulties inherent in formulating, much less
implementing, public goals. He worried
about how policy advocates—his famous
phrase is the “man of system”—become so
attached to their system that they ignore
private goals in service to the system. In his
view, and even more prominently in the recommendations of his two followers, James
Mill and John Stuart Mill, public discourse
may attenuate this problem by better aligning the incentives of the system makers
to the private goals of those in the system
(Peart and Levy 2015). Why Government
Fails so Often demonstrates why the issue is
even more critical now than it was in Smith’s
time. Peter Schuck’s important book reminds
us about the allure of expert judgments and
the need for public discourse at each step
along the traverse of policy formulation and
implementation.
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